Poles Apart

Written by Andrew Duff MEP and published in Financial Times Online - www.ft.com on Mon 22nd Dec 2003

How to recover from the fiasco of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in Brussels last weekend? The chronology of what went wrong at the summit meeting is being gradually pieced together. It is clear that no one is mourning the passing of the inherently lazy presidency of Silvio Berlusconi. But the pain and the shame is spread more widely. Brussels was a collective failure of political leadership on a large scale. There was too little appetite for substantive debate on the outstanding issues. The IGC met in plenary session for less than 90 minutes. Most of the leaders kicked their heels for hours on end while fruitless small 'confessionals' took place. The Presidency's important compromise proposals of 9 December were not subjected to political negotiation.

The reticence of the leaders to engage in political debate illustrates an alarming lack of self-assurance. Too many of them have no evident grasp of the argument. Such ignorance of the facts might be excusable among the fraternity of the heads of government from the accession states. It is unpardonable for the leaders of the existing states, some of whom had obviously not read the Convention's draft Constitution for themselves, while others seemed unaware of the precise negotiating position of their ministers and officials.

Worse still, there had been insufficient bilateral contact among the 25 governments in the run up to the summit. Fatally, Spain and Poland believed they had secured the backing of the UK for their bid to return to the Council voting formula of the Treaty of Nice. But Britain in Europe is a fickle partner, and Blair quickly peeled away under Franco-German pressure. Earlier determination by Aznar and Miller of where reliable allies were to be found would probably have saved the summit and brought home the Constitution. In the end, even Aznar accepted the principle of the double majority system preferred by the Convention (although not the equation on offer). The Poles were left to hang out to dry.

France, Germany and Belgium were the chief protagonists for the outcome of the Convention. Chirac, in particular, played the tough guy with the Poles. Both he and Schroeder invited Blair to reduce the number of his 'red lines'. Following the break-up of the summit, both men, with Verhofstadt, spoke of the growing attraction, or even inevitability, of a two-tier Europe. Chirac spoke of a 'pioneer' group that would be a motor of integration, that would 'set an example' to those who 'lack experience', and that would go forward 'faster, further and better'. Justice and home affairs, economic governance as well as 'other areas' were mentioned.

Blair clearly has no strategy to deal with the emergence of core group politics in Europe. He is pleased with the deal on structured cooperation in defence, brokered with France and Germany - although that deal still has to be confirmed as part of the overall, eventual, constitutional package. Blair said he would consider the UK's participation in other core groups depending on the subject matter. This must be doubted, however. Indeed, it is probable that Blair's precious 'red lines' have neatly defined where the integrationists will first try enhanced cooperation. Their aim will be to strengthen economic governance and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, as well as to overcome specific British vetoes over social security for migrant workers and administrative cooperation in fiscal matters.

Blair's claim that he has successfully 'banked' his 'red lines' is based only on the word of Berlusconi, a chairman whose own credit-worthiness is less than universally acknowledged. Blair has no formal agreement on any one of his key objections to the draft Constitution, not excluding his continuing objections to making legally binding the Charter of Fundamental Rights. He also knows, even if his compliant House of Commons failed to notice on Monday, that nothing is agreed at an IGC until everything is agreed. Blair's red lines are set to come back to haunt him as the IGC gets underway again.

And get underway again it surely will. The in-coming Irish presidency is in a difficult but not impossible position. The Taioseach, Bertie Aherne, told the Dail on Tuesday that if a deal can be done during the Irish presidency he is determined that it will be. He sees an 'emerging consensus on most institutional questions'. He also makes clear that the basis for the Irish work will be the sixty or so compromise proposals published by the Italian presidency on 9 December. Charged by the IGC to consult and bring back a progress report, the Irish consultations could be broad or narrow. The Dublin government would be wise, however, to seek early advice from leading members of the Convention, including Giscard, Amato and Dehaene, on the acceptability or otherwise of the Italian proposals.

Urgency is the order of the day. The European Parliament, on Thursday, called Berlusconi's bluff by inviting him to publish a detailed list of the 82 items on which he claims he was able to secure agreement in Brussels. MEPs also called on the Irish presidency to reconvene the IGC at foreign ministers level in January and to set a date for a summit meeting before 1 May. The timetable is crucial. The constitutional project was first set in train so that the Union could deepen at the same time as enlarging. To refrigerate the draft Constitution, as Blair would dearly like, will lead to its early obsolescence. The momentum must be kept up, not least to help the Polish parliament undertake a serious examination of the real issues at stake in its lonely fixation with Nice.

To delay even until the autumn, and the Dutch presidency, might be a bad mistake. The Dutch government does not enjoy an altogether coherent European policy, and it is no more influential or experienced than the Irish. It will in any case be lumbered with two neuralgic issues: the decision on Turkey's status as an accession country and the new multiannual spending round. On the latter, at least, the Netherlands is a principal demandeur, and the intertwining of the constitutional debate with such controversial items is not propitious. As far as Spain is concerned, it may well be easier for a deal to be done in the dying weeks of the Aznar regime than in the opening ones of his successor's. And, as has always been argued, it would be democratically fitting to let a signed but yet-to-be-ratified Constitution become an issue of lively public debate during the European Parliamentary elections in June. The IGC fiasco has certainly triggered the start of that debate in several countries, not least in Spain. All in all, the argument for a quick re-start to the IGC is, indeed, compelling.

Poland apart, a solid agreement on the Constitution is probably closer than last weekend's performance would suggest. Clever brokerage, spiced with self-effacing Irish charm, can achieve a respectable deal on the basis of the Convention's proposals. The fact that the IGC method has failed makes both the process of the Convention and its outcome even more attractive. Nobody now disputes, for example, the need for a full-time and more professional presidency of the European Council!