Swedish Lessons

Written by Andrew Duff MEP and published in Financial Times Online - www.ft.com on Sat 27th Sep 2003

The opening of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), called to adopt the EU's constitution is less than a fortnight away. The Italian presidency of the Council is working hard to bring Giscard's draft home by 13 December without too many changes. Yet few other governments have resisted the temptation to strike postures on one issue or another. There was a fairly futile Convention reunion of fourteen self-selected small states plus Poland in Prague. The tripartite summit of Blair, Chirac and Schroeder in Berlin is followed by a Blair-Aznar dialogue in Madrid. The Finnish government published a candid critique of the outcome of the Convention. The UK government produced a less comprehensive but well-spun check list of items it wishes to see changed by the IGC. Last week the European Commission published a rather testy Opinion on the opening of the IGC. Later this week, in Strasbourg, the European Parliament will deliver a more positive green light for the Conference to start. The Parliament's welcoming verdict on the Convention's draft constitution is mirrored, in general, by academic opinion.

A common theme of these preparatory episodes, however, is the growing concern that, even if the IGC proves to be short and decisive, the final version of the constitution will be unable to enter into force because its ratification will have faltered in one country or another. The problem is that the treaty establishing the constitution has to be given birth under the provisions of Article 48 of the existing Treaty on European Union. This prescribes unanimity at the IGC followed by ratification in each of the twenty-five member states according to their own (and highly varied) national constitutional requirements. A parliamentary upset there, a court challenge here, or a referendum blown is all too possible. Precedent is not on the side of those who would wager a smooth and untroubled entry into force for united Europe's new constitution. The sense of democratic malaise, especially in 'old Europe', is palpable. The political class goes unloved. Parliamentary institutions that fail to reform lose credibility. In the context of globalisation, Europe's state system appears to be unable to offer the citizens homespun solutions to social, economic, scientific or environmental problems. Political parties and the media, both notoriously resistant to radical change, so far have offered little in the way of a transnational response to fit Europe's interdependent political society.

Deep concern about Europe's democratic problem was the main driving force behind the work of the Convention. Its members were very much aware that lack of democratic confidence in the European Union runs deep, a verdict confirmed by a recent survey from the British Electoral Commission which finds that, as far as the EU is concerned, the "sense of political disconnection is compounded by a very high level of ignorance". Worse, public indifference will not be over-turned by a traditional public relations campaign, because "indifference is reflected in a desire to keep institutions at arm's length". The key to engaging the EU citizen with his or her polity is to make votes count. In other words, the electorate must be convinced that it can make a difference at the European level to a policy or to the choice of leadership.

The rejection of euro membership in the Swedish referendum is a salutary reminder of the need for genuine public choice. Faced with the imminent prospect of constitutional ratification, the whole European Union needs to examine why Swedes voted against more integration.

There were, of course, the particular Swedish circumstances, such as poor timing with polling day and bad luck with the economy. Sweden's growth rate is still higher than that of the eurozone and its unemployment lower, indisputable facts that serve to boost the Swedes' sense of effortless superiority. The cavalier attitude of France and Germany to the stability pact cannot have helped to convert the fairly puritanical Swedes to further continental entanglement. But Sweden is far from being exceptional in that there has never been a sustained effort by its politicians to put the case for more Europe. Nor is it unique in being a generally conservative kind of place, enjoying its fair share of ultra-nationalist head-bangers. Few are the Swedish politicians who countered the public malaise by putting the case for Europe with wit and guts.

Even the prime minister, Goran Persson, appeared defensive about the transcending issue of his term of office. He conceded that if the referendum said yes to the euro it might not mean membership now. Even a no vote would not mean no for ever. Above all, he made the fatal mistake of not putting his own job on the line. If the vote was no, he said, he would not resign. Persson's declaration of irresponsibility mirrors public cynicism - and feeds it. What the poor man was saying, in effect, was that, whatever happened, the result of the referendum would make no difference to him, to Sweden or to Europe.

Persson is not the first member of the European Council to have shirked his democratic responsibility to lead the Union. Is it really too much to hope that he will be the last? Tony Blair, at least, should know that no referendum on any European issue can be won in Britain unless he commits his own career.