Blair set to miss new defence Union

Written by Andrew Duff MEP and published in Financial Times Online - www.ft.com on Mon 5th May 2003

The aftermath of the Iraq invasion has seen the European Union in a mood of despondent reflection, more quiet sulking than open warfare. The UK has had the sense not to trumpet a great and glorious victory in Baghdad. Britain's EU partners have been fairly restrained in commenting upon the great and glorious mess that that victory has left in its wake. The sharpest skirmishes were reserved for the extraordinary summit meeting in Brussels of the leaders of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg on 29 April. This is a pity, as the summit's potential to resolve historic difficulties is huge.

In May 1952 the same Brussels four, plus the Netherlands and Italy, signed a Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC). The Treaty committed its signatories to collective defence and to the common organisation, equipment and training of the armed forces under a single command, within NATO. Political control was to be established by a Council of ministers, in which votes would be weighted according to military contribution, and by an Assembly (in fact, borrowed from the already existing Coal and Steel Community). Executive power was to be wielded by a Commission, which would oversee an integrated general staff. The Commission would programme the coordination of the national armed forces with the ultimate aim of complete fusion.

Gradually, however, the Six lost confidence in their own baby. France, especially, continued to fear the German rearmament implicit in the EDC project, and, in any case, became increasingly embattled in Indo-China. Eventually, in August 1954, the French National Assembly rejected the EDC Treaty by a majority of 55 votes, made up mostly of Gaullists and Communists.

The UK, which with the USA had supported the EDC Treaty, then took immediate steps to strengthen the Western European Union (WEU) as the Europeans' own contribution to military coordination within NATO. But nothing very much happened to WEU, which never achieved credibility as a collective defence organisation until it was effectively taken over by the European Union in the 1990s. The Maastricht Treaty said that the EU should frame progressively its own defence policy, leading in time to common defence. Until now, however, practical progress has been slow. When real decisions about military integration have to be taken, the problem of what to do with America rudely intrudes. Indeed, for fifty years Franco-British disagreement about US relations has hampered the search for European autonomy in military matters. Seen in that light, Tony Blair's decision to side with Washington in the teeth of opposition from Paris and Berlin is no more than the latest in a long line of regrettable and critical incidents that impair European unity.

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, chair of the European Convention, was so depressed at this latest downturn in transatlantic relations that he feared that little or nothing could be done to draft constitutional articles on security and defence. So, in an interesting reversal of roles, it was left to the floor of the Convention to drive the agenda forward. We have picked up the argument dropped at the time of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) to permit a military core group of EU member states to emerge. As well as widening the Union's objectives to include disarmament and anti-terrorism operations, along with conflict prevention and peace enforcement tasks, the Convention seems to be on the point of agreeing more permissive methods to get the capable and the willing to form a defence avant-garde. A European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency will be set up for those who want to use it. Member states 'which fulfil higher criteria for military capabilities and which have made more binding commitments to one another' will be allowed to forge ahead. Non-participating countries will be enabled to catch up later if they are capable of doing so.

Critics of this approach have been right to point out the absurdity of replacing one rather spurious commitment to collective defence (Article V of the WEU treaty) with another. But they have not read the end of the story. Constitution mongering will not of itself provide Europe with the autonomous military capacity it needs to compensate for the passing of NATO. Other political action needs to be taken to complement the good work of the Convention. This is where the Verhofstadt initiative scores.

The Belgian prime minister is well-known as a European activist. Without Guy Verhofstadt the Laeken European Council would never have set up the Convention. Now he wishes to demonstrate that core group politics can work as a catalyst within the European Union. Verhofstadt believes that Europe as a whole will benefit if a small number of states go forward to a higher degree of military integration than achieved so far. He knows there is no national consensus in Belgium for increasing expenditure on purely national defence - as does, painfully, Gerhard Schroeder in Germany. Yet they find, as do many MEPs, that an increased defence effort on the European level is popular. Public opinion, even in Britain, is positive to the notion of greater added value in stronger European security. Defence is one of the things, along with the environment, where people see a need for more Europe, not less. It is Verhofstadt who is responding well to this sentiment, not Blair.

Defying its critics, the Brussels summit last week has brought new impetus to European defence. The four leaders ask the Convention to provide in the future Constitution for a fully-fledged European Security and Defence Union that would 'gather those member states that are ready to go faster and further in strengthening their defence cooperation'. Seven concrete initiatives are launched to give credence to the initiative, including the commitment of the existing Franco-German brigade to the nucleus of the EU rapid reaction force, the unification of strategic air transport, and common military training. Crucially, the four have agreed to establish the nucleus of a common command to be made available to EU operations not using NATO resources. Under the cover of this EU project, all four leaders hope to be able to enhance their military spending.

The British and Americans are foolish to scoff at this approach. While it is true that the UK's exclusion group makes the core group weaker in military terms, it makes it much stronger politically. A new dynamic has been created in the Convention as the impact of the Verhofstadt initiative avant la lettre is felt upon the drafters of the new Constitution. Are fifty years of defence frustration about to be over? Tony Blair must now realise he is faced with yet another opportunity to miss in Europe.