Turkey and the Constitution and the Turkey Question

Written by Andrew Duff and published in FT.com on Wed 2nd Feb 2005

In France and the Netherlands, both facing referendums before the summer, the question of the EU constitution has got inextricably mixed up with that of Turkish membership. Not for the first time, dislike of Turks fuels nationalism in Europe. Fear of Islam provokes a Christian over-reaction. Also troubled are those moderate European politicians, committed to the federal path, who worry that perpetual enlargement of the Union will lead to its dilution. For these, the prospect of Turkish membership on top of the recent spate of new members is the last straw.

The European Parliament, refreshingly, set aside such inhibition. In December MEPs voted by 407 to 262 to support the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. In January they voted by 500 to 137 to endorse the constitution. For many MEPs the two controversies combine to define the European identity. They argue that without the strengthening of the EU implicit in the constitution there can be no prospect of admitting Turkey. Most MEPs would concede that the nationalists are at least correct in surmising that no constitution means no Turkey and probably no Croatia (or anywhere else, for that matter). A European Union enlarged to Turkey without being at the same time deepened by internal reform simply would not work and should not be contemplated. But a large majority of the Parliament has enough confidence in the power of the constitution to ensure that the Union can continue to grow without losing the momentum of integration.

French and Dutch critics of the constitution are confounded by those Turks who complain that the constitutionalisation of the Union unfairly raises the threshold of membership. Wiser Turkish opinion, however, is content that the constitution does not define the conditions for membership in terms of size, demography or religion but in terms of the values, principles and objectives of liberal democracy. The constitution's geographical criterion that member states should be 'European' should not impede membership for Turkey which not only hosts Europe's largest city but is also tied to Europe by centuries of history and culture. Europe would not be what it is today without the legacy of Turkey.

Moreover, the EU's own process of constitutionalisation demonstrates to Turks that it is not only they but Europeans also who have to modernise their system of government to reflect the needs and aspirations of contemporary society. Constitutional reform, refurbishment of old institutions, rationalisation of instruments, streamlining of decision-making procedures, redefinition of values and objectives, integration of fundamental rights, combating discrimination on the grounds of race, gender and religion, strengthening the rule of law, separation of legislative from executive powers, bolstering parliamentary democracy, fostering subsidiarity, encouraging decentralisation - these are all part of Europe's current project. They should be part of Turkey's too.

Both Turkey and the European Union need to rise to the challenge of globalisation. Europe's constitutional reforms and Turkey's efforts to assimilate those reforms equip them politically to meet the challenge together. Europe's slowly emerging common foreign, security and defence policy will be highly stimulated by the admission of the Turks. Turkey is a longstanding member of NATO but is no longer a poodle of the USA. Indeed, in refusing to support the American invasion of Iraq, Ankara showed a degree of independence which many British might envy. Turkish membership will extend Europe's reach and responsibilities to the borders of the Caucasus, the Gulf and the Middle East. It is odd for those like the French and the Dutch who have in the past worked for the EU to become a global player now to baulk at the chance to achieve that objective.

That is why the majority of MEPs back the opening of Turkish accession negotiations despite the relative hostility of European public opinion. A good start on the campaign to win over public support in Europe would be for Turkey not to haggle unduly over the terms of the marriage contract, but just to get on and enjoy the relationship. Turkey's priority tasks are clear: to grow the economy, to eliminate political oppression and to implement the EU's acquis communautaire.

Turkey will also have to pass two other big tests before being accepted as genuinely ready for EU membership. The first is to end the civil war against Kurdish separatists. The PKK must be brought down from the mountains and persuaded to abandon the use of arms. Kurdistan separatism must be accommodated somehow within the mainstream of Turkish politics.

The second hurdle is Cyprus. The opening of accession negotiations is a de facto concession by Turkey that it recognises the Republic of Cyprus, but Turkey still needs to do more to reassure moderate Greek Cypriot opinion that the Annan Plan will work in practice. Turkey must soon sign and ratify the revised Ankara Agreement to extend its customs union with the EU to all twenty-five member states of the Union. Withdrawal of some troops from North Cyprus, as foreseen under the UN proposals, would be desirable. In return, the European Council must face down Tassos Papadopoulos, the nationalist Greek Cypriot leader, and open up direct trade and investment with Turkish Cyprus.

Turkey will never arrive at its European destination unless and until there is a comprehensive and final reconciliation of Turks, Greeks and Kurds. The European Union, strengthened by its new constitution, should be ready and willing to help.