British and French referendums threaten Europe's stability

Written by Andrew Duff and published in in Swedish Magazine on Mon 21st Mar 2005

Europe's new constitution is now subject to a lottery. Sweden is wise not to add to the instability by threatening a referendum of its own. One looks forward to a solid vote by the Rijksdag after a considered parliamentary debate by MPs informed by the opinions of the people they represent.

Elsewhere in Europe, things are being mishandled. The next spectacular show is in France where, on 29 May, the referendum will decide the fate of the constitution and the future of the European Union. Unsurprisingly, it seems that the French people are being typically bloody-minded. The negative camp is gaining ground not so much because people are reading and disliking the constitutional text but because the government of President Chirac is unpopular. A referendum is a perfect opportunity for the public to demonstrate discontent with a government of the day without being obliged to change it for something worse.

What happens in France today is perfectly normal, and will be repeated in the British referendum next year. In both countries a truculent public is sorely tempted to confound its political class. Europe's elite is almost universally in favour of the constitution. Of the large mainstream political parties in Europe only the British and Czech conservatives are officially campaigning for No. They are joined by the far right, by the far left, and by a smattering of separatist forces such as Sinn Fein.

The irony is that of all the twenty-five member states of the EU, only Ireland and, arguably, Denmark are mandated by their own constitutions to have referendums on European integration. In other countries, as in Sweden, ratification could have proceeded smoothly by votes in national parliaments. Of course, it is possible to argue, as has been done in Spain and Luxembourg, that a referendum brings a fresh popular legitimacy to the European cause. But such high motives are possible only where the popular mood is overwhelmingly positive and the outcome certain. Elsewhere, grandiose claims about democratic legitimation should be treated sceptically: the flight to plebiscite is a sign of national weakness rather than European strength.

In Britain, for example, the decision to ditch parliamentary ratification in favour of a referendum has been taken for fairly low motives. The UK parliament and its parties seem to be intimidated by their constitutional duty to revise the EU treaties and have shuffled it off on to the shoulders of the hapless citizen. In countries like Britain and Poland, parliamentary democracy at the national level is failing to cope with the challenge of European integration.

France is, as always, rather different. The government has good reasons to support the EU constitution, of which Valery Giscard d'Estaing remains the principal author, and which meets a number of long-standing French objectives. Europe will be better placed to stand up to the Americans. The establishment of a European core group in defence is foreseen, autonomous from NATO. The European Council, in which the French President plays a pre-eminent role, is consolidated. The threshold for the admission of new member states goes up, and structured cooperation with near neighbours is introduced. (The truth is that it will be more difficult for Turkey to join the EU with the constitution than without it.) The Charter of Fundamental Rights becomes mandatory. The CAP survives. Space policy is introduced. The cultural exception from commercial policy is retained. Social cohesion is prescribed. God keeps himself out of it.

French European policy is fairly consensual. Unlike Britain, there has been a bipartisan approach in France to the strategy of building the European Union. The need to assure a continued close partnership with Germany has habitually united the French left and right - a partnership which will explode spectacularly if France says No. Because of De Gaulle, the French left has even been more solid in its support of European integration than the right. One expects, for example, to hear more from the left than the right about the way the constitution enhances the budgetary and legislative powers of the European Parliament. Absolutely nothing in the manifesto of the French socialist party is precluded under the EU constitution. It is true that the IGC was conservative on some issues and made too many concessions to the neo-Gaullism of Tony Blair who was backed up too often by Goran Persson. But the constitution is not immutable. It has sufficient flexibility within it to allow it to evolve gradually to changing circumstances. And it can, of course, be revised in the future - on the initiative of the European Parliament.

None of these arguments might be enough to persuade the cynical French or the sceptical British to back the new constitution. As things stand, the likelihood is that the French will deliver a petit Oui and the British a resounding No. If and when that happens Sweden must be in the forefront of those who insist that the constitution must be brought into force despite the British rejection. The existing Treaty on European Union (Article 48) will have to be changed to enable this to happen. But the UK will have neither the moral authority nor the political credibility to block constitutional progress for the rest of Europe. If twenty four member states show their determination to go forward without Britain, the British public may very well be persuaded at that stage - but not before - to face up to political realities. The question in a second British referendum would be 'In or Out?'. That is a more sensible question for a plebiscite than the one about the constitution that nobody will read. And more sensible questions get more sensible answers.

Andrew Duff MEP is spokesman on constitutional affairs for the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE).