Crisis in the Middle East

Written by Andrew Duff and published in ft.com on Mon 11th Sep 2006

The tone of the European Parliament as it confronts the latest crisis in the Middle East is much more incisive and united than is customary. Instead of the usual hand-wringing about the impotence of the European Union in face of intractability, MEPs have lent their strong backing to the decision of the Council to send a large armed force to Lebanon and to take command of UNIFIL. EU countries will soon field 7000 troops, several ships and aircraft, including heavy-lift equipment. They will be joined by forces from Norway and, notably, Turkey, which, after a difficult domestic debate, will be sending almost 1000 troops to Lebanon for the first time since 1920. The EU has already committed € 330 million towards reconstruction aid.

Amid the tortuous byways of Middle East politics, it should not go unremarked that Hizbollah has welcomed the dispatch of Turkish troops, or that Israel has accepted the imminent arrival of German troops. On the diplomatic front, it may be thought surprising that Syria has declared its support for UN Resolution 1701 which establishes the new mandate for UNIFIL and whose express purpose is to boost the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese government. But the apparent conversion of Syria to a European dialogue allows France to assume operational control for the first six months.

Parliamentary cheer at the unprecedented degree of cohesion among EU member states is tempered, nevertheless, with anxiety about the military risks involved. The rules of engagement of the European troops appear to allow them to defend themselves from attack by either Israel or Hizbollah. The EU forces will go on the offensive only if requested to do so by the Lebanese authorities. Because the European and other foreign forces are working under UN auspices, the EU's own command and control structures are less integrated than they are, for example, in the case of the existing, autonomous EU forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo or at the Israeli-Palestinian border in Rafah. How UNIFIL will fare under fire is questionable, not least because most of the EU forces involved are untested in combat.

There has been much criticism of Tony Blair's refusal to call for a ceasefire during the first fortnight of the hostilities. The prime minister's apparently unshakable attachment to the policy of George W. Bush has fuelled old suspicions that Britain is too much the American poodle. The UK has not redeemed its reputation by the nature of its actual contribution to the military effort in Lebanon, which is minor. Some MEPs regard Britain's military 'over-stretch' in Iraq and Afghanistan more as the pretext for and not the cause of British stand-offishness.

Beyond the largest ever joint deployment of its armed forces, the European Union is pursuing a more confident political strategy. The Parliament is setting the pace in calling for an international conference on security and cooperation in the Middle East, leading to a permanent framework. Closer cooperation with the Arab League is envisaged, and MEPs must put new energy behind the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, established in 2003. Earlier inhibitions about dealing with Hizbollah and Hamas are evaporating. Israel can expect no sympathy if it continues to reject peaceful co-existence with a viable Palestinian state. That Israel enjoys a profitable Association Agreement with the EU does not go unnoticed in the difficult negotiations about how to finance aid to the region. The European Parliament would support a future deployment of an EU force in Palestine comparable to that to be deployed in Lebanon.

Over the summer, the EU has had a chance to make a real difference in the Middle East, and the good news is that it has seized it. It begins to be possible for the Union to move on from its bad divisions over Iraq and to act together in a situation that looks much less futile than that of Afghanistan. A solution to the present crisis along the lines of Resolution 1701 is unthinkable without the leadership of the EU. Leadership is not something which comes easily to the European Union. But Lebanon has close historical, cultural and political ties to Europe, and even more so with a Europe that would build a lasting partnership with Turkey. A collapsing Lebanon is too close a prospect for comfortable Brussels.

The new, more decisive nature of EU common foreign and security policy provides at long last a credible framework within which Germany can return to the international arena. Europe's influence would be yet larger, of course, if the UK were to become a full and active participant in the common effort. But that would mean a radical switch in British policy away from the American towards a European preference. In that case, Lebanon would be the decisive turning point for both Britain and Germany.